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COMMENTS
THE STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE: HOW STATE
TAKINGS STATUTES MAY RESOLVE THE
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS OF PALAZZOLO
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world of "Hobbesian stick[s]" ' and "Lockean bundle[s]," 2
analytical confusion should be expected. Indeed, critics describe
the world of federal takings jurisprudence as "an unworkable
muddle,"3 as "a jumble of confusing holdings,"4 and as a body of
law existing in "doctrinal and conceptual disarray."5 Since the
United States Supreme Court first considered the regulatory tak-
ings issue in Mugler v. Kansas,6 the Court's inconsistent applica-
tion of the doctrine has largely conformed to criticism.' Governed
1. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2462 (2001).
2. Id.
3. J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doc-
trine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 102 (1995).
4. James L. Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction, 25
ENvTL. L. 143, 144 (1995).
5. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, 77
CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1304 (1989).
6. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
7. In Mugler, the Court immunized "valid" police power regulations of the state. Id.
at 668-69. Yet in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) the Court recog-
nized a taking for any regulation that went "too far." Id. at 415. Four years later, the
Court virtually ignored the Mahon holding in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), and continued to do so until deciding the 1978 case of Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the Court pro-
posed a three-factor test to determine whether a taking had been committed. Id. at 124.
Later, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) the Court pro-
posed an "economically beneficial use[ ]" test. Id. at 1019. For a discussion of regulatory
takings, see WmLLAu B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WiTMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.4 (3d
ed. 2000).
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by abstruse metaphors' and ad hoc analysis, the Court acknowl-
edges its imprecision 9 and often relies upon it. °
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island," however, the Court reordered at
least some of the discontinuity that previously troubled critics in
three ways. First, by bifurcating the approaches of previous case
law, the Court provided takings plaintiffs with two distinct re-
gimes." Second, by doing so, the Court opened the courthouse
door to landowners who purchased properties with knowledge of
the burdensome regulation, whereas previous cases had left the
issue undecided. 3 Third, by clarifying the final action require-
ment, the Court provided further guidance into the ripeness con-
sideration. 4 Yet while Palazzolo helped to alleviate the "unwork-
able muddle" 5 of precedent, the Court failed to provide a "set
formula" for the takings determination. 6 Questions remain as to
application and degree.
However, as the case slowly climbed the appellate ladder, 7 a
peculiar legislative phenomenon began to take hold in state legis-
latures-the property rights statute. By 1995, over sixty "Private
Property Protection Acts" had been introduced by state officials.'"
The bills generally appeared in one of two forms: "as 'assessment'
statutes or 'compensation' statutes." 9 While the former required
8. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
9. "[Tlhis Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula'... ."Penn
Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
10. "[Wlhether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid.., depends largely
'upon the particular circumstances [in that] case." Id. (quoting United States v. Cent.
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)) (second alteration in original).
11. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
12. As later analysis will make apparent, Palazzolo examined the facts at issue under
both the Lucas test and the Penn Central test. See infra Part III.B-C.
13. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) the petitioners
had notice of the regulation at the time of purchase, but the actual taking occurred after
the petitioners acceded to ownership. Id. at 827-28. Therefore it was left unclear as to
whether the owner could recover for a regulatory taking that occurred before transfer of
ownership. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2471 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
14. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458.
15. Byrne, supra note 3, at 102.
16. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2466 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
17. See Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 657 A.2d 1050 (R.I. 1995).
18. Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to
"Environmental Takings", 46 S.C. L. REV. 613, 633 (1995).
19. Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.
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state agencies to assess the impact of future regulation on prop-
erty rights,2 ° the latter went further, establishing trigger levels to
determine takings compensation.2' Later bills proposed pre-
litigation procedures to resolve takings disputes.22 Labeled by
some as "the worst anti-environmental law[s] ever passed in the
United States,"23 many of these bills survived heated criticism
from environmentalists; in 2000, almost half of the states main-
tained some form of property rights legislation.'
Along with Palazzolo, state private property rights statutes
provide a workable and complimentary framework for takings de-
terminations. While state statutes cannot necessarily supplement
the body of federal law, they may nevertheless provide federal
lawmakers with a template to help delineate the previously
blurred contours of case law. Further, these state statutes provide
landowners with a strategic advantage, during both the adminis-
trative and litigation stages of takings disputes, which is unavail-
ing to the federal takings plaintiff. In the realm of economic
analysis, "strategic behavior" is defined as "acting inconsistently
with one's true preferences in order to obtain some short-term col-
lateral advantage."25 While considerations of strategic behavior
provide a subtext for the dissent's criticism in Palazzolo,26 these
concerns are more explicitly borne out in the policy criticisms of
statutory takings analysis. Thus, "strategic advantage" provides a
backdrop for the discussion of both approaches to takings law.
This comment explores these questions and criticisms, and at-
tempts to resolve them by reference to recent state statutes. Part
II of this comment provides a constitutional context for the law of
regulatory takings and describes the two initial analytical ap-
proaches taken by the Supreme Court. Part III examines the re-
cent Palazzolo decision and poses four basic questions left unre-
solved by Supreme Court jurisprudence. Next, Part IV surveys
J. 527, 540 (2000).
20. Id. at 542-43.
2L Id. at 544-45.
22. These include both alternative dispute resolution statutes and mandatory negotia-
tion statutes. See infra Part IV.B; see, e.g., infra note 125.
23. Marianne Lavelle, The 'Property Rights' Revolt, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 1, 34.
24. Oswald, supra note 19, at 538.
25. Brief ofAmicus Curiae Institute for Justice at 16, Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg. Planning Agency, No. 00-1167 (U.S. filed Jan. 29, 2002).
26. See 121 S. Ct. at 2462-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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several notable state property rights statutes and attempts to
piece together a comprehensive approach to the regulatory tak-
ings issue. Part IV also examines the basic criticisms of the state
property acts, particularly those relating to the notion of "strate-
gic advantage," and comments upon their relative merits by ref-
erence back to issues explored in Palazzolo. Finally, Part V con-
cludes that the convergence of the two bodies of law forms a
patchwork solution to the regulatory takings issue.
II. THE CONTEXT OF THE TAKINGS DILEMMA
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment precludes the tak-
ing of property without just compensation,27 and this prohibition
is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.28
While the Takings Clause most obviously prevents the state from
physically taking private property without compensation, the
seminal case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon" similarly pre-
vents state regulation from over-burdening property without
compensation." Subsequent case law is directed by Justice
Holmes's admonition that "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."3 This has since become known as a regulatory taking.
In recent years, courts have utilized two distinct approaches to
determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred. The first is
the three-factor test delineated in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,32 and the second is the "economically viable
use" standard established by Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.33 Both inform the outcome of the latest and perhaps
most far-reaching Supreme Court takings decision, Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
29. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
30. Id. at 414-16.
31. Id. at 415.
32. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
33. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
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A. The Three Factors of Penn Central
Before 1992, courts analyzed regulatory takings cases under
the approach in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.34 To determine whether the landowner deserved compensa-
tion for burdensome regulation, Penn Central examined three dis-
tinct factors: (1) "[the economic impact of the regulation"; (2) "the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with [the owner's]
investment-backed expectations"; and (3) "the character of the
governmental action."35
As to the first factor, Penn Central made clear that a diminu-
tion of property value, standing alone, will not effect a taking.3 6 In
various pre-Penn Central cases, the Court determined that a
diminution exceeding seventy-five percent would not alone estab-
lish a taking.37 As a consequence, the examination of the eco-
nomic impact of the property required by this first factor consid-
ers not only the percentage of devaluation but also whether the
economic effects disproportionately impact the particular owner.8
The investment-backed expectations of the second factor focus
upon whether the owner purchased the property with actual or
constructive knowledge that the regulation existed.39 If the pur-
chaser knew that the regulation existed, then the owner may be
estopped from claiming that the regulation harmed the prop-
erty.4" However, where the regulation is enacted after the pur-
chase, the owner may seek compensation for the frustration of
her investment-backed expectation.41
As the third and final factor, the Court examined the character
of the state action.42 While this factor lacks definition, Penn Cen-
tral noted that "[a] 'taking' may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical in-
34. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(applying Penn Central factors to the Surface Mining Act).
35. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
36. Id. at 131.
37. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384, 397 (1926) (approximately
75% diminution in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 414 (1915) (87.5%
diminution in value).
38. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
39. See id. at 127-28.
40. See id.
41 Id.
42. Id. at 124.
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vasion by government than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good."43 Therefore, the greater the
physical impact on the property, the more likely the Court would
construe the regulation as a taking."
B. Lucas and the Deprivation of All Economically Beneficial Use
In 1992, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council established a
new conceptual framework for analyzing takings cases. Under
Lucas, the Court collapsed the three factors of Penn Central, hold-
ing that a state must compensate owners for deprivations of "all
economically beneficial uses" of real property.4 Though the gen-
eral standard employed by the Court appears somewhat vague, it
is nevertheless clear that the state may not leave the owner with
merely a "token interest" in the property.46
Under Lucas, the denominator (or the yardstick by which the
deprivation is measured)47 is shaped by (1) the traditional under-
standing of the "bundle of rights" that makes up real property
ownership, and (2) the state's power over that bundle of rights.'
Since denial of all economically viable use violates the traditional
understanding of real property ownership, the regulation that so
deprives the property shall be considered a taking.49 As a conse-
quence, the state may regulate only to the extent that it may do
so under the "background principles" of state property law.50
III. PALAZZOLO'S CONTRIBUTION TO TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
In Palazzolo, the Supreme Court altered traditional takings
analysis by reinforcing the viability of both approaches. At issue
43. Id. (citations omitted).
44. See id.
45. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
46. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464.
47. For a discussion of the "denominator problem," see Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1190-93 (1967).
48. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
49. Id. at 1016.
50. Id. at 1029. Examples include laws concerning the common law tort of nuisance or
those passed pursuant to the general police powers of the state.
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in Palazzolo are three fundamental hurdles in litigating regula-
tory takings claims: ripeness considerations, the investment-
backed expectations of the owner, and the extent of the economic
deprivation needed to constitute a taking.5'
The significance of each of the issues is evident upon examina-
tion of the facts of Palazzolo. In 1959, Palazzolo's corporation,
Shore Garden, Inc. ("SGI"), purchased a property in Rhode Island
and filed several applications to fill low-lying coastal properties
for use as a beach club.52 Each proposal was rejected by the ap-
propriate state agency.53 In 1971, Rhode Island established an
administrative council to implement regulations restricting de-
velopment of wetland areas.54 Subsequently, SGI transferred title
to the property to Palazzolo." In 1983 and again in 1985, Palaz-
zolo sought permission to construct a bulkhead, fill the low-lying
areas, and construct a beach club.56 The Council denied the appli-
cations, stating that the proposed activity did not serve a "com-
pelling public purpose" so as to justify a special exception from
the strict land use requirements.57
Consequently, Palazzolo filed suit for violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. He alleged that the agency's "action
deprived him of 'all economically beneficial use' of his property.""
Palazzolo sought $3.15 million in damages-a number derived
from the estimated value of a seventy-four-lot subdivision on the
low-lying portion of the property.59
A. Ripeness
As a general matter, a landowner may only proceed with a tak-
ings claim where "'the government entity charged with imple-
menting the regulations has reached a final decision regarding
the application of the regulations to the property at issue."'6 ° That
51. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2457.
52. Id. at 2455-56.
53. Id. at 2456.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2458 (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)).
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is, where the claim is ripe for review. In Palazzolo, the state con-
tended that Palazzolo's claim was unripe since: (1) the owner did
not submit an application calling for development of only the up-
land parcel; (2) the value and use of the upland parcel was un-
known; and (3) Palazzolo failed to submit an application based on
a seventy-four-lot subdivision.6'
First, the Court answered that the "[r]ipeness doctrine does not
require a landowner to submit applications for their own sake.
Petitioner is required to explore development opportunities...
only if there is uncertainty as to the land's permitted use."62 At
trial, the Agency admitted that they would have allowed the de-
velopment of a single residence on the upland parcel.63 Therefore,
the permitted use of the property was reasonably certain.'
Second, since the state did not raise the issue at trial, the
Court disallowed any contest of Palazzolo's valuation of the prop-
erty.65 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the state relied upon
Palazzolo's valuation in its brief, as well as Palazzolo's expert
during trial.66 The state also argued that Palazzolo's use was un-
known, since the $200,000 value of the upland parcel was based
upon a Lucas claim-not a Penn Central claim.67 Since the ap-
proaches are educated by separate factors, the state contended
that Palazzolo's reliance on Lucas precluded the state from argu-
ing at trial that it may have allowed more than one residence to
be built on the property-thereby rendering uncertain the
Agency's permissible uses.6" However, the Court answered that
both Lucas and Penn Central factors are applicable to takings
cases, regardless of which factors the parties rely upon at trial.69
61. Id. at 2460-61.
62. Id. at 2460 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2460-61.
65. Id. at 2460.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 2461.
68. Id.
69. Id. The dissenters took issue with the Court's use of both factors, despite the peti-
tioner's reliance on Lucas:
The critical point, however, underplayed by the Court, is that Palazzolo never
raised or argued the Penn Central issue in the state system: not in his com-
plaint; not in his trial court submissions; not-even after the trial court
touched on the Penn Central issue-in his briefing on appeal. The state high
court decision, raising and quickly disposing of the matter, unquestionably
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Finally, the Court dismissed the state's ripeness concern re-
garding Palazzolo's failure to submit a seventy-four-lot subdivi-
sion plan.70 The state contended that Palazzolo employed a "hide-
the-ball" strategy to submit applications for more conservative
uses, thereby circumventing the process of obtaining zoning ap-
proval.7 Thus, the state concluded that Palazzolo would subse-
quently be allowed to claim damages upon development plans
that would not have been approved by the municipality. 2 The
Court found this inquiry to be irrelevant to the ripeness consid-
eration, reasoning that a more extensive development plan would
not have affected the Agency's determination of whether a land-
owner could fill the property.73
Thus, the Court in Palazzolo held that where a state agency
that enforces a land use regulation "entertains" and denies an
application, and it "makes clear the extent of development per-
mitted," a petitioner may not be prevented from bringing a cause
of action by federal ripeness rules.74 Additionally, federal ripeness
rules do not require a petitioner to submit "further and futile ap-
plications with other agencies." 5 Yet this leaves open a signifi-
cant question: What constitutes "further and futile applications"?
In Lucas, the Court did not require the Petitioner to submit a
formal application where the regulation prevented the use on its
face. 6 In contrast, the Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes7 found that the Petitioner's five submitted applications
sufficed." The resulting ambiguity leaves landowners with a dif-
ficult risk analysis. To determine whether to engage in the costly
application process, owners must balance the significant burdens
and expenses of "playing the agency's game" with the uncertainty
of pursuing a potentially unripe claim. While Palazzolo does not
permits us to consider the Penn Central issue. But the ruling below does not
change the reality essential here: Palazzolo litigated his takings claim, and it
was incumbent on the State to defend against that claim, only under Lucas.
Id. at 2475 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 2461 (Kennedy, J.).
7L Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2462.
75. Id.
76. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012-13 (1992).
77. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
78. See id. at 698.
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require landowners to "submit applications for their own sake," 9
it certainly does not provide a bright-line test for ripeness.
B. The Post-Regulation Purchaser
Similarly, Palazzolo leaves open a question regarding the ne-
cessity of an owner's investment-backed expectations. In Palaz-
zolo, the state asserted that since Palazzolo accepted title to the
property with knowledge of the relevant regulations, he was
deemed to have notice of the restrictions and was therefore
barred from claiming a taking under Lucas.8"
In arguing that Palazzolo should be precluded from bringing a
takings claim, the state relied upon the holdings of the two
benchmark constitutional takings cases. First, the state con-
tended that under Penn Central, a post-regulation purchaser has
certain investment-backed expectations that include an under-
standing that the property is subject to restrictions."' This factor,
along with the regulation's economic effect and character of the
governmental action, "inform[s] the takings analysis," and may
therefore prove fatal to a takings claim. 2 Second, the state
pointed to the holding in Lucas to support its assertion that a
state may shape property rights and ostensibly create the yard-
stick by which regulatory takings are measured.83 Thus, the state
contended that since (1) it was permitted to shape property
rights, and (2) the buyer took the property with notice of the re-
strictions, the buyer may not bring a takings claim.'
The Court dismissed this argument, determining that a state's
duty to shape property rights is tempered by a reasonableness
standard. 5 While it has long been held that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment allows an owner to assert that a regulatory
action is so unreasonable as to amount to a compensable depriva-
tion, it is also true that the passage of title cannot cure an unrea-
sonable restriction. 6 That is, a state may not "put an expiration
79. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2460.
80. Id. at 2462.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2466 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 2462 (Kennedy, J.).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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date on the Takings Clause.""7 Though it is clear that a state may
shape the contours of property rights, it may not unreasonably
burden the defining characteristic of property ownership-the
right to transfer." Preventing owners who purchase with notice of
the regulation from receiving compensation would therefore in-
fringe upon the owner's ultimate right-transferability. 9
Thus, the Court determined that a property owner's notice of a
particular regulation would not bar that owner from bringing a
takings claim under Lucas.9" What is unclear, however, is the ex-
tent to which the owner's investment-backed expectations may af-
fect the takings analysis. Particularly, the concurring opinions
took issue as to whether this consideration is still essential to the
Penn Central claim. While Justice O'Connor maintained that the
owner's constructive notice of regulation was significant in the
Penn Central approach,9' Justice Scalia found the issue to be
wholly irrelevant to both inquiries. The concern, according to
Justice Scalia, may be that a shrewd real estate investor might
purchase property with the hopes of litigating a takings claim
and receive a windfall.93 However, by denying compensation for
lack of an investment-backed expectation, Justice Scalia argued
that the approach would "giv[e] the malefactor the benefit of its
malefaction."94 Therefore, while Palazzolo states that the expecta-
tions of the owner are not dispositive to the inquiry, it leaves open
the question of whether and to what extent his expectations fac-
tor into either approach.
87. Id. at 2463.
88. Id. (citing Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1368-69
(1993) (noting that the right to transfer interest in land is a defining characteristic of the
fee simple estate)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2464.
91. Id. at 2465 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that "today's holding does not
mean that the timing of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is
immaterial to the Penn Central analysis").
92. Id. at 2468 (Scalia, J., concurring).
[Tihe fact that a restriction existed at the time the purchaser took title (other
than a restriction forming part of the 'background principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance') should have no bearing upon the determina-
tion of whether the restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 2467-68.
94. Id. at 2468.
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C. Deprivation of All Economically Beneficial Use
Palazzolo alleged that the $200,000 value remaining in the up-
land parcel constituted token interest and asserted that he was
entitled to compensation under Lucas.95 The Court refused to up-
hold this argument, finding that Palazzolo was not deprived of all
economically viable use of the property.9 While the Court left the
precise amount of the total deprivation undecided, it concluded
that $200,000 was simply too much value to be considered a "to-
ken interest."97
However, Palazzolo framed the claim at the state court level as
a total deprivation of the economic value of the parcel as a
whole-including both the lowland and upland areas.9" The Court
ignored Palazzolo's contention on brief that the deprivation suf-
fered by the lowland areas singularly constituted a total taking
compensable under Lucas.99 Thus, the Court expressly left unan-
swered the question, explored in a rather famous footnote in Lu-
cas, of what is the precise denominator to be used in such takings
claims.' 0 For instance, could a landowner such as Palazzolo claim
a total deprivation of solely the wetland areas of the property as a
separate and severable interest in the whole? Interestingly, the
Court analyzed the Agency's rulings as to the upland and lowland
areas separately in Part II.A of the opinion, which may lend
credibility to the severability argument.'' Nevertheless, the issue
remains unresolved.
D. Remaining Questions
Palazzolo goes a long way toward alleviating the confusion of
federal takings jurisprudence. It provides: (1) that landowners
who purchase property with notice of a regulation are not cate-
gorically barred from bringing a takings claim;' 2 (2) that a cause
95. Id. at 2464 (Kennedy, J.).
96. Id. at 2465.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992)).
101. Id. at 2458-62.
102. See supra Part III.B.
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of action will ripen when a state agency entertains the applica-
tion and denies it, making clear the extent of development per-
mitted; °3 and (3) that $200,000 of remaining value is not a "token
interest" under the Lucas analysis."4 However, despite each of its
holdings, Palazzolo leaves open four significant questions:
1. When is the use of the parcel reasonably certain for ripeness
considerations?
2. To what extent do investment-backed expectations now af-
fect the takings analysis?
3. How much value must be taken to result in a compensable
taking?
4. What is the proper denominator for determining the per-
centage of value taken?
The answers, it appears, may already have been written.
IV. THE NEW TAKINGS ALTERNATIVE: STATE PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS STATUTES
In recent years, property rights advocates have sought legisla-
tive solutions to cure the federal takings confusion.0 5 The 104th
Congress entertained two bills in 1995 that provided mandatory
trigger levels for compensation at twenty and thirty-three per-
cent.0 6 Though the bills failed to pass, state legislators took no-
tice. To date, twenty states have enacted some form of private
property rights legislation.' 7 These statutes provide landowners
103. See supra Part HI.A.
104. See supra Part III.C. But see Michael Allan Wolf, Pondering Palazzolo: Why Do We
Continue to Ask the Wrong Questions?, [2002] 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10367,
10367 (Mar. 2002) (arguing that Palazzolo merely expands already "highly problematic
and unnecessarily confusing" approach to takings).
105. For an examination of the history of compensation clauses in state constitutions,
see CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON
THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND 832-34 (4th ed. 1989).
106. H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995). Five years later, Con-
gress made another unsuccessful attempt with the Private Property Rights Implementa-
tion Act. H.R. 232, 106th Cong. (2000). The texts of these bills are available online at CIS
Congressional Universe, http'//web.lexis-nexis.com/cis (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
107. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1311 to -1313 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 29-20-201 to -205 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (1997); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-8001 to -8004 (Michie 2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 77-701 to -711 (Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3:3609 to :3622.1 (West
Supp. 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3341 (West Supp. 2001); MICH. COiM. LAWS
ANN. §§ 24.421 to .425 (West 1994); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-33-1 to -15 (1999); Mo. ANN.
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with tools to prevent burdensome regulation, accelerate the ad-
ministrative appeals process, and obtain just compensation from
state regulatory agencies. Thus they may be categorized into one
of three general types: assessment statutes, conflict resolution
statutes, and compensation statutes.0 8
A. Assessment Statutes: Avoiding the Question
Assessment statutes require states to more closely scrutinize
actions that may affect a taking.'0 9 These statutes are often re-
ferred to as "look before you leap" statutes, requiring governmen-
tal entities to assess the regulatory impact on property rights be-
fore agency action."' If the regulations do in fact burden private
landowners, many of the statutes "require [the state] to either
pay just compensation or to refrain from action.""' While assess-
ment statutes do not specifically address the issue raised in Pa-
lazzolo, they at least provide states with a mechanism to prevent
takings squabbles before litigation.
Most statutes require the state attorney general to create a
checklist or process to determine whether the landowner has been
burdened with a compensable taking."2 Often, state legislatures
provide a litany of basic factors to be considered when creating
the checklist, such as the purpose to be served by such regulation
and the alternatives available to the governmental agency." 3
STAT. § 536.017 (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.425 (Michie 1995); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 74-6-12 (Michie 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.772 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-1-
201 to -206 (1999); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.002 to .043 (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 63-90-1 to -4 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.370 (West Supp. 2002); W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1A-1 to -6 (Michie 1998); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-5-301 to -305 (Michie
2001).
108. Oswald, supra note 19, at 540 & n.53.
109. See id. at 541-43. These statutes are often modeled after President Reagan's Ex-
ecutive Order 12,630, which required federal agencies to assess agency impact on private
property rights before promulgating regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,629, 53 Fed. Reg.
8,859 (Mar. 15, 1988).
110. Oswald, supra note 19, at 542.
111. Id. at 542-43.
112. Such states include Idaho, Kansas, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
See sources cited supra note 107.
113. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-5-303(b) (Michie 2001).
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More lenient statutes require agencies to simply "use the guide-
lines" when making regulatory decisions. 4
Other states, however, require the agency to fasten the attor-
ney general's guidelines into a takings impact assessment.115 Ac-
cording to Kansas's Private Property Protection Act, the state
agency must prepare a written report using the guidelines that
require it to: (1) clearly identify the public health, safety or wel-
fare risk created by the use of the property; (2) describe the public
purpose for such regulation; (3) set forth a justification for the ac-
tion; (4) analyze the likelihood that the action may result in a
taking; (5) identify any alternatives; and (6) ensure that a direct
relationship exists between the action and the public purposes to
be substantially furthered."6 The "direct relationship" require-
ment imposes a stricter standard for state agencies to follow, and
it therefore weighs against the traditional degree of discretion
granted to state agencies.
Arizona forged another creative approach to the assessment
statute by establishing a state advocate for private property
rights."' The advocate is appointed by the director of the Arizona
legislative council to "represent the interests of private property
owners in proceedings involving governmental action.""' The ad-
vocate represents residential, noncommercial, small business,
and agricultural property owners before state agencies or judicial
bodies, as well as receives complaints from any other property
owners."1
9
According to some authors, these statutes provide "merely a
symbolic reiteration" of existing takings law, and have "little or
no impact on existing doctrine."' However, like the National En-
vironmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 2 ' assessment statutes impose
an overarching procedural obligation into the decision-making
114 Id. § 9-5-304. The Idaho statute indicates that state agencies "shall" use the guide-
lines, yet expressly prohibits a landowner from suing the agency for failure to use the
guidelines. IDAHO CODE § 67-8003 (Michie 2001).
115. These states include Kansas, Louisiana, and Texas. See sources cited supra note
107.
116. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-706 (Supp. 2000).
117. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1312 (Supp. 2001).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 41-1313(B).
120. Oswald, supra note 19, at 548.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
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process, requiring states to "stop and think" about proposed im-
pacts. 22 In particular, takings impact reports make apparent the
extent to which the state agency may have relied on the attorney
general's factors, and may therefore reveal the attenuated nexus
between the state's stated purpose and the state's action. Thus,
assessment statutes provide both a statutory incentive to avoid
intrusive regulations and a means to circumvent litigating
through the unanswered questions of Palazzolo.
B. The Conflict Resolution Statute
1. Q: When Is the Use Reasonably Certain?
A: Upon Issuance of Ripeness Decision.
For the landowner, the costs of conducting a protracted admin-
istrative appeal often outweigh the relative compensation to be
received for a taking-particularly where the governmental ad-
versary enjoys superior resources and lacks similar market con-
straints.123 The costs of litigation may even further burden a de-
prived landowner.'24 It is for these reasons that some states have
enacted conflict resolution statutes.'25 These statutes provide set
procedures for negotiation between the landowner and the state
to accelerate the administrative process and provide finality.
Such statutes may (1) establish set administrative procedures for
negotiation, or (2) provide for alternative dispute resolution.
122. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411-1312, -1313 (Supp. 2001); IDAHO CODE §
67-8003 (Michie 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-704, -706 (Supp. 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 3:3609, :3622.1 (West Supp. 2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-1-203 (1999); TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 2007.043 (Vernon 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.370 (West Supp.
2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-5-303, -304 (Michie 2001).
123. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 1068-69 (2d ed. 2001).
[Tihe enjoyment of property rights through the development of land into so-
cially useful projects... is fraught with risk. In particular, delay is poten-
tially ruinous to developers, since interest charges and taxes tick away, at-
torney fees pile up, and risks of weather, strikes, and changing markets are
ever present. On the other hand, planners and municipal attorneys are paid
from tax revenues. While not downplaying the legitimate governmental con-
cern about takings liability, in almost all cases municipalities have far supe-
rior resources to withstand delays than landowners.
Id.
124. Id. at 1070.
125. See, e.g., FLA. STA. ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 §
3341 (West Supp. 2001).
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Florida, for example, maintains both such provisions. The Bert
J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Act ("Harris Act")126 pro-
vides a mandatory 180-day negotiation process as a condition
precedent to litigation.'27 Under the Harris Act, the aggrieved
landowner must file a claim with the governmental entity that
adopted the regulations that resulted in the loss in market value
of the property.128 If the landowner fails to comply with the notice
requirement, the landowner is barred from bringing a claim un-
der the Harris Act's compensation provisions. 29
More significantly, the statute further indicates that the gov-
ernmental entity must make a written settlement offer within the
180-day notice period. 3 ° In the event that the landowner does not
accept the entity's settlement offer, the entity must issue a writ-
ten ripeness decision that identifies the allowable uses of the
property.' 3' The statute explicitly provides that "[t]he ripeness de-
cision, as a matter of law, constitutes the last prerequisite to judi-
cial review, and the matter shall be deemed ripe or final for the
purposes of the judicial proceeding created by this section, not-
withstanding the availability of other administrative reme-
dies.""'82 The Harris Act therefore provides landowners with a
"free pass" to court, without regard to the administrative status of
the case.
While the Harris Act applies only to those regulations which
became effective after May 11, 1995, 8 the Florida Land Use and
Environmental Dispute Resolution Act ("FLUEDRA") 34 provides
an alternative for landowners to resolve disputes arising from
any agency decision made after October 1, 1995, regardless of
whether that decision relied upon a pre-1995 regulation.'35
FLUEDRA provides for the appointment of a "special master" for
126. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (West Supp. 2002). This statute applies to land use regu-
lations that came into effect after May 11, 1995. See id. § 70.001(12).
127. Id. § 70.001(4)(a).
128. Id.
129. See Sosa v. City of West Palm Beach, 762 So. 2d 981, 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(dismissing amended complaint for failing to comply with the prerequisities for bringing
suit under the Harris Act).
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(4)(c) (West Supp. 2002).
131. Id. § 70.001(5)(a).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 70.001(12).
134. Id. § 70.51.
135. Id. § 70.51 (30).
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"[a]ny owner who believes that a development order.., or an en-
forcement action.., is unreasonable or unfairly burdens the use
of the owner's real property .... "136 The special master is directed
to facilitate a resolution to the conflict "to the end that some
modification of the owner's proposed use of the property or ad-
justment in the development order or enforcement action or regu-
latory efforts by one or more of the governmental parties may be
reached."137 The Act provides eight examples of circumstances to
be evaluated in the negotiations, including the history of the
property and its development, the history of the relevant land use
controls, the present nature of the property, the reasonable ex-
pectations of the owner either at the time of acquisition or regula-
tion (whichever is later), the public purpose sought by the devel-
opment order or enforcement action, uses authorized on
comparable properties, and any other "relevant information."3 '
The special master must prepare a recommendation within
fourteen days of the conclusion of the hearing.'39 The responsible
governmental entity may either accept, reject, or modify the spe-
cial master's recommendations. 4 ' If the parties do not agree on
the recommendations, or if the entity modifies the recommenda-
tions, then the entity must issue a ripeness decision within thirty
days that describes all possible uses available to the property.'
2. Ripeness in 180 Days
Thus the Florida statutes effectively resolve the issue left open
in Palazzolo concerning whether the designated use of the prop-
erty is "reasonably certain" for ripeness considerations.' While
136. Id. § 70.51(3)-(4).
137. Id. § 70.51(17)(a).
138. Id. § 70.51(18).
139. Id. § 70.51(19).
140. Id. § 70.51(21).
141. Id. § 70.51(22).
142. Florida's statute stands in contrast to that of Maine, which established its land
use mediation program in 1995 to "provide eligible private landowners with a prompt, in-
dependent, inexpensive and local forum for mediation of governmental land use actions as
an alternative to court action." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3341(1) (West 2001). Maine's
Alternative Dispute Resolution Service selects mediators with knowledge in land use is-
sues. Id. § 3341(2)(A). Mediators are directed to conduct negotiations in the municipality
where the conflict is located and to facilitate a "mutually acceptable solution." Id. §
3341(6). The mediator must file the findings with the Superior Court clerk within ninety
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in Palazzolo the Court engaged in an analysis of the procedural
admissions and reliance of the state," the Florida statutes pro-
vide landowners with evidentiary proof of the total existing uses
of the burdened parcel of land.' Armed with the statutorily re-
quired ripeness decision, landowners gain a procedural advantage
that is unavailable to the federal plaintiff. Where previous plain-
tiffs held their property in administrative limbo for years, the
Florida statutes impose a 180-day limit and grant landowners an
absolute right to litigate the outcome in a state court.145 Thus,
Florida provides that the use allowed by the state is "reasonably
certain," using the verbiage of Palazzolo, upon the issuance of the
ripeness decision.
3. The Ripeness Decision and Strategic Behavior: Is It Leveling
the Playing Field or Just Bait-and-Switch?
The "ripeness decisions" of the Florida statutes alleviate a con-
siderable burden upon landowners-the final decision require-
ment. 46 As the dissent in Palazzolo made clear, this prerequisite
is no small obstacle;'47 it requires that the landowner exhaust her
administrative appeals so that the court may "know the nature
and extent of permitted development.'"' Thus, conflict resolution
statutes not only resolve the "reasonably certain" language of Pa-
lazzolo, but they also serve to provide landowners with a strategic
advantage during the administrative appeals process.
days of the agreement. Id. § 3341(12). What the statute does not provide, however, is a no-
tice of ripeness.
Under the Maine approach, landowners are eligible to participate in the mediation proc-
ess if they have either: (1) suffered "significant" harm resulting from governmental regula-
tion; (2) failed to obtain a permit, variance or special exception, and pursued reasonable
avenues of appeal (for municipal land use action); or (3) sought and failed to obtain state
approval due to a final agency action or refusal of agency to act. Id. § 3341(3). The land-
owner must pay an amount not exceeding $175 for the initial four hours of mediation, with
both parties sharing the costs for any additional time. Id. § 3341(2)(C), (9).
143. See supra Part I1I.A.
144. See supra notes 130-31.
145. See supra notes 130-32.
146. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 191
(1985).
147. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2472-73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986); Williamson County, 473
U.S. at 191).
148. Id. at 2472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348).
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Under traditional ripeness considerations, the exhaustion re-
quirement would provide regulatory agencies with the procedural
upper hand, namely, the threat of administrative delay. 4 9 By ex-
posing petitioners to greater risk and greater financial hardship,
agencies are able to "freeze out" landowners before litigation of
their claims. 5 ' Administrative delay has therefore become a
prime tool for regulatory agencies to defeat the rights of landown-
ers, particularly during the discretionary permit process.'15
In Palazzolo, the Court undercut the state's ability to "freeze
out" landowners when the Court determined that Palazzolo could
proceed with his takings claim despite the fact that he had not
submitted plans to develop solely the upland parcel.'52 In its criti-
cism of the Court's ripeness rationale, the dissent characterized
Palazzolo's submitted plans as a "bait-and-switch ploy."'53 The
dissent argued that Palazzolo submitted a "'highly ambitious'"
and "'grandiose' plan that considered only alternatives requiring
wetland filling.' Presumably, the dissent concluded that Palaz-
zolo knowingly submitted an impermissible plan for the purpose
of bringing suit; thereafter, Palazzolo sought compensation for a
lesser taking.'55 The result is "inequitable," according to the dis-
sent, because the state is precluded from examining alternatives
that did not require filling.'56
While such results may appear inequitable to the dissenters in
Palazzolo, under the Florida conflict resolution statutes, such
"bait-and-switch" is not only tolerable, but sanctioned. Although
the apparent purpose of the dispute resolution statutes is to pro-
hibit state agencies from "stalling" property owners from taking
their claims to court, the acts also implicitly encourage owners to
present "grandiose" plans and valuations. As stated by one com-
mentator, the mandatory negotiation required by the legislation
provides the landowner with a distinct procedural advantage,
particularly in the valuation stages of administrative appeal:
149. See EAGLE, supra note 123, at 1004.
150. For examples of administrative delay tactics, see id. at 1006-10.
151. See id. at 1004.
152. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465.
153. Id. at 2474 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2473 (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S.
340, 353 n.9 (1986)).
155. Cf MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352-53.
156. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2473-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The property owner will present her most optimistic evaluation of
the property's value in the real estate appraisal that accompanies
her initial claim. Since the property owner will be selecting the real
estate appraiser and paying for her fee, the incentive is for the prop-
erty owner to select an appraiser who will produce a favorable re-
port. In addition to this "objective" valuation, the land also has a
"subjective" value to the landowner, an amount the landowner would
actually require to part with her property. This figure might be ei-
ther higher or lower than the parcel's objective value. The property
owner's minimum acceptable value is, then, her private information
and would not generally be known to the land use entity.
1 57
As illustrated by the "informational advantage" described
above, the fee owner is granted considerable discretion during the
administrative process to pursue her development objectives.
Thus, the concern of the dissenters in Palazzolo is a non-issue
under the statutes: after the statutorily mandated negotiation pe-
riod, the ripeness decision provided by the state agency will nev-
ertheless provide the landowner with the key to the courthouse
door-freeing her to "bait" at her discretion. Though this strategic
behavior may or may not run consistent with contemporary tak-
ings jurisprudence, 58 the result may be necessary to level the
procedural playing field and prevent the bureaucratic treadmill of
administrative delay.
C. Compensation Statutes
Headline: Developer Threatens to Sue County
Stuart [Fla.] - A developer's lawyer vowed Thursday to sue Martin
County if commissioners reject plans to fill two wetlands during con-
struction of a long-delayed motel near Palm City's turnpike ex-
change.
"We're going to sue the county under the Bert Harris (Property
Rights) Act for whatever damages we suffer as a result of putting
[this] condition on us, for sure. That's where we're headed."159
157. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Florida's Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix Re-
sults in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 390 (1995).
158. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
159. George Andreassi, Developer Threatens to Sue County, THE STUART NEWS/PORT
ST. Luce NEWS, Jan. 18, 2002, at B1.
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Compensation statutes may provide the greatest weapon for
landowners seeking compensation for state regulation of private
property. These statutes typically require the state to compensate
the landowner for loss in the value of property beyond a certain
percentage (usually between ten and fifty percent).60 Currently,
only four states have enacted compensation statutes: Florida,
Texas, Mississippi, and Louisiana.161
1. Florida's Inordinate Burden Standard
a. Q: To What Extent Do Investment Expectations Affect the
Analysis?
A: As an Isolated Criterion for a Separate Cause of Action.
While the Harris Act mandates state agency assessment of
regulations affecting property rights, the statute more signifi-
cantly provides landowners with a separate and distinct cause of
action from the law of takings.'62 The Act states that the Florida
legislature recognizes "an important state interest in protecting
the interests of private property owners from... inordinate bur-
dens." 63 The statute therefore provides relief for landowners
when state regulations unfairly affect their property.'
The keystone of the Act is subsection two, which states that
where a governmental entity has "inordinately burdened an exist-
ing use of real property or a vested right to specific use of real
property, the property owner... is entitled to relief."'65 Such re-
lief may include compensation for the actual loss to the fair mar-
ket value of the property. 66 The use of property is "inordinately
burdened" when
an action of one or more governmental entities has directly restricted
or limited the use of real property such that the property owner is
permanently unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectation for the existing use of the real property or a vested right to
160. See Oswald, supra note 19, at 544.
161. Id. at 544-45.
162. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(1) (West Supp. 2002).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 70.001(2).
166. Id.
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a specific use of the real property as a whole, or that the property
owner is left with existing or vested uses that are unreasonable such
that the property owner bears permanently a disproportionate share
of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness
should be borne by the public at large.
167
Thus, the "inordinate burden" standard applies two lines of ex-
isting takings jurisprudence: (1) the frustration of the owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (2) the dispro-
portionate burden upon the landowner for a public benefit. The
definition then excludes temporary impacts, impacts occasioned
by governmental abatement, remediation of public nuisance, and
acts taken to grant relief to property owners. 68 The statute thus
shies away from the "deprivation of all economically beneficial
use" standard of Lucas,'169 and requires a lower threshold for state
takings claims."'0
State takings claims under the Harris Act are applicable only
to "vested right[s]" and "existing use[s] .""7 Vested rights derive
from three sources: principles of equitable estoppel, substantive
due process under common law, and state statutory provisions.7 2
Existing uses are defined as "actual, present use[s] or ac-
tivit[ies]."'7' As defined, these uses may exclude such state action
as variances, conditional use permits, and other municipal land
use actions which could be actionable under the "disproportionate
burden" prong of the "inordinate burden" standard. Due to the
limited litigation of the Act, however, the full scope of its reach
remains unclear. 74
Thus, if the governmental action falls within the scope of the
Act and inordinately burdens the property, the Harris Act pro-
167. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
168. See id.
169. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1972); see also discussion
supra Part II.B.
170. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(9) (West Supp. 2002) (This section provides a cause of
action for governmental actions that may not rise to the level of a taking under the State
Constitution or the United States Constitution.").
171. Id. § 70.001(2).
172. Id. § 70.001(3)(a).
173. Id. § 70.001(3)(b).
174. For an examination of cases that address the Harris Act, see generally Ronald L.
Weaver & Nicole S. Sayfie, Environmental and Land Use Law: 1999 Update on the Bert J.
Harris Private Property Rights Protection, 73 FLA. B.J. 49 (1999).
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vides a civil remedy to compensate landowners.'75 Compensation
is determined by calculating the difference between the fair mar-
ket value of the property as though the owner could retain his in-
vestment-backed expectation, or was not left with unreasonable
uses, with the fair market value of the property as inordinately
burdened.'76
b. Expectations Made Easy
In federal takings jurisprudence, the extent to which the in-
vestment-backed expectations of the owner affect the outcome is
now a debatable issue. In Palazzolo, the Court held that the
owner with knowledge of the imposing regulation at purchase
was not categorically barred from bringing a federal takings
claim-most specifically under the Lucas approach.'77 However,
the Justices differed as to whether the investment-backed expec-
tations of the owner were relevant to the Penn Central ap-
proach.17
8
The Harris Act resolves this ambiguity by providing an alter-
native cause of action 79 that is based, in part, on the sole criterion
of whether the regulation frustrated the owner's reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations.8 0 Unlike the three-factored analy-
sis of Penn Central,'8' the Florida statute provides a disjunctive
takings standard that may allow the owner to proceed under ei-
ther an expectations approach or a general fairness approach. 82
Thus, by separating and isolating factors of previous case law, the
Harris Act avoids the complications of Penn Central, and corre-
spondingly resolves the conflict between the Justices in Palazzolo.
175. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(6)(a) (West Supp. 2002).
176. See id. § 70.001(6)(b).
177. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2463.
178. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
179. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(1) (West Supp. 2002).
180. See id. § 70.001(3)(e).
181. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also dis-
cussion supra Part II.A.
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e) (West Supp. 2002).
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c. Risks, Windfalls, and Malefactors
Yet by basing a cause of action solely on the expectations of the
investor, the Harris Act raises significant questions regarding
ownership and investment in real property. For example, does a
cause of action based solely on the expectations of the owner pro-
vide a publicly funded subsidy for land-speculators by insuring
that their expectations will be satisfied?8 Rather, shouldn't the
purchaser be the appropriate risk-taker?' The issue is thus
whether the "inordinate burden" standard provides an incentive
for strategic behavior via land speculation.
In what appears to be a growing number of cases, this issue
has come to the forefront of the debate over the Harris Act. 8 5 In
one recent case pending in a Florida state court, developers who
received approval for a high-rise Miami Beach condominium sued
Miami-Dade County for a subsequent rezoning ordinance."6 The
ordinance truncated their tower from thirty-two floors to six
floors, and allegedly slashed the fair market value by $5 mil-
lion.8 7 The developers, who were clearly left with some viable
economic value remaining in the six-story condo, pursued a Har-
ris Act claim and asserted that their investment-backed expecta-
tions were frustrated.
88
The criticism with claims like this one, as stated by one Miami-
Dade County attorney, is that "[t]here is nothing written in any
law anywhere that just because you invest in land you are enti-
tled to a return on your investment.... People lose money all the
time in the stock market."'89 Presumably, then, the real estate in-
vestor who receives compensation under the Harris Act for the
frustration of his expectations receives a "windfall," where he
183. See James M. McElfish, Jr., Property Rights, Property Roots: Rediscovering the
Basis for Legal Protection of the Environment, [1994] 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,231, 10,247 (May 1994) (arguing for the proposition that under a traditional property
scheme, ownership does not extend to speculative uses).
184. See Tyson Smith, Investment-Backed Expectations, Background Principles, and
the Public Interest: Palazzolo and Beyond, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z 1, 17-
18 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001).
185. See Terry Sheridan, Putting the Bert Harris Act to the Test, BROWARD DAILY Bus.
REV., Nov. 5, 2001, at Al.
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Id.
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would normally suffer the deprivation as a natural consequence
of his investment risk. Indeed, investment in real property, as in
any other commodity, requires investor risk assessment. 9 ° As
such, critics argue that property owners have an obligation to in-
vestigate state statutes and local regulations before purchase; to
provide otherwise would be to shift the investor's burden of risk
to the state.'9'
The proper response to such criticism complements Justice
Scalia's discussion of "windfalls" in Palazzolo, arguing, ironically,
that the investment-backed expectations of the owner ought not
to bear on the constitutional takings analysis.'92 The concern that
underlies the expectations criterion, according to Justice Scalia, is
the fear that real estate speculators will gamble on the unconsti-
tutionality of a particular regulation, purchase the property at a
deflated price, and litigate the taking to receive full-value,
thereby receiving a "windfall."'93
This can, I suppose, be called a windfall-though it is not much dif-
ferent from the windfalls that occur every day at stock exchanges or
antique auctions, where the knowledgeable (or the venturesome)
profit at the expense of the ignorant (or the risk averse). There is
something to be said (though in my view not much) for pursuing ab-
stract "fairness" by requiring part or all of that windfall to be re-
turned to the naive original owner .... But there is nothing to be
said for giving it instead to the government-which not only did not
lose something it owned, but is both the cause of the miscarriage ....
It is rather like eliminating the windfall that accrued to a purchaser
who bought property at a bargain rate from a thief clothed with the
indicia of title, by making him turn over the "unjust" profit to the
thief.1 94
Thus, Justice Scalia rebuts the assertion that the property-
owner ought not to benefit from a previous taking, arguing that to
provide otherwise would be to allow the "malefactor the benefit of
its malefaction."19 Stated differently, to preclude the owner from
recovery would allow the "taker" to benefit from its "taking."
190. See Smith, supra note 184, at 17.
191. Id.
192. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
193. See id.; see also Anello v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1997)
(arguing that to allow the post-regulation purchaser to challenge the regulation would
provide a windfall for speculators at the expense of the public).
194. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 2468.
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Clearly, the argument criticized by Justice Scalia differs sig-
nificantly from the arguments opposing the expectations-based
"inordinate burden" standard of the Harris Act. Yet both are edu-
cated by a similar bias-a belief that property ownership is sub-
ject to changing societal interests.196 The former argument states
that a property owner should not receive a windfall for a taking
preceding her ownership, for such a claim would invite "venture-
some" speculation; 197 the latter argument states that a property
owner should not receive a windfall for takings subsequent to
transfer of ownership, for the risk of regulation ought to be inher-
ent in speculative transactions.'9 Each of these arguments seeks
to allocate the burden away from the government and onto the
speculator for the reason stated above: that the public ought not
subsidize land speculation, and thus, the buyer ought to be the
appropriate risk-taker.' 99
Yet in allocating the risk and expense of the regulatory taking
from the public to the private owner, these arguments undermine
not only the intent of Palazzolo and the Harris Act, but also our
most basic notions of takings and our most basic understanding of
property rights. As the Court states in Palazzolo, "[takings] in-
quiries are informed by the purpose of the Takings Clause, which
is to prevent the government from 'forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."'200 The notion that the public in-
terest may determine the extent of one's property right runs
counter to our post-Lucas sensibilities: the public interest may af-
fect the bundle of rights, but only to the extent that it may do so
under the police powers of the state.2' To extend this right any
196. See Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings
Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 233 (1997); see also Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Proposi-
tions on Private Property, Public Rights and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 265, 268-82 (1996).
197. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
198. It is of note, though only peripherally, that the right of fee simple ownership tradi-
tionally included the right to speculate thereupon. The right, recognized by eighteenth-
century common law, is explicitly recognized in the dictum of Lord Coke: "for what is the
land but the profits thereof[?]" 1 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITTES OF LAWS OF ENGLAND,
ch. 1 § 1 (Garland Publ'g 1979) (1628).
199. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
200. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2457-58 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)).
201. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EMINENT DOMAIN 58-
59 (1985).
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further would be to allow Justice Scalia's malefactor to continue
to violate the takings principles in the name of an amorphous and
indeterminate "public good."
2. The Texas Trigger
a. Q: How Much Value Must be Taken to Affect a Compensable
Taking?
A: Twenty-five Percent.
The Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (the "Texas
Act") also provides a cause of action for governmental actions re-
sulting in a taking.2"2 The approach of this statute differs signifi-
cantly from the Harris Act, however. Under the Texas Act, "tak-
ing" is defined in two ways. First, the statute defines "taking" as
"a governmental action that affects private real property, in
whole or in part or temporarily or permanently, in a manner that
requires the governmental entity to compensate the private real
property owner as provided by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments ... .,,203 This definition provides landowners with an ex-
panded constitutional takings claim, yet also includes the consti-
tutionally uncompensable temporary taking.
Second, the statute defines "taking" as a governmental action
that limits the owner's right to use the property absent the regu-
lation and reduces the market value of the property by twenty-
five percent.20 4 The value of the diminution is established by com-
parison of the market value before and after the governmental ac-
tion.2 °5
The statute applies to four categories of governmental actions:
(1) adoption of ordinances, rules, regulations, resolutions, policy
guidelines, or similar measures; (2) actions imposing physical in-
vasions or exaction of property; (3) actions having extraterritorial
effects; and (4) actions listed in (1) through (3) where the en-
forcement is accomplished with permits, citations, orders, judicial
202. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007.021 (Vernon 2000).
203. Id. § 2007.002(5)(B).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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or quasi-judicial proceedings, or other similar means." 6 The
Texas Act does retain a number of exceptions, however, including
regulations that restrict nuisance, prevent waste of oil and gas,
and promote water safety, hunting, and fishing.2 7 Also, the stat-
ute exempts actions taken by political subdivisions to regulate
construction in designated floodplains and regulate on- site sew-
age facilities, to protect rights of groundwater, and to prevent
subsidence.08
b. The Good and the Bad
Despite the expansive exceptions, the Texas Act provides the
formula that Lucas and Penn Central failed to establish: a
benchmark trigger to determine a compensable taking. Palaz-
zolo's forebearers make apparent the benefits of the compensation
statute in two respects. First, the bright line test introduces much
needed analytical clarity into the takings calculus.2 9 Under Lu-
cas, the "deprivation of all economically viable use" determination
often requires an ad hoc and ambiguous factor-analysis that is al-
leviated by the statutory trigger.10 Second, by providing compen-
sation for all applicable takings beyond twenty-five percent, the
Texas statute significantly expands the traditional takings defini-
tion to include mere diminutions of property value.211
Unlike the risk-allocation and incentive issues considered ear-
lier, the concern over strategic behavior is unavailing in the per-
centage-based compensation context since determining the dimi-
nution of property values is largely the appraiser's game. Still,
commentators typically offer three frequent criticisms of the
Texas Act that are generally applicable to all compensation stat-
utes.2 12 First, critics warn that takings compensation resulting
from the Texas Act could cost local governments severely.213 Often
cited in support of this proposition is a University of Washington
study estimating that a similar compensation statute in Wash-
206. Id. § 2007.003(a).
207. Id. § 2007.003(b).
208. Id.
209. Cordes, supra note 196, at 226.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 227-28.
213. Id. at 227.
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ington would cost local governments as much as $11 million.214
Second, critics argue the related proposition that it would be fun-
damentally unfair for the public to bear the costs of compensa-
tion.215 This notion again implicates the burdens of allocation
mentioned previously: for those who find that the benefits of
property ownership ought to be tempered by prevailing public in-
terests (whatever they may currently be), this is an especially
resonant claim.216 However, under a post-Lucas schema, where
one's property rights extend to the limits of the state's police pow-
ers, this proposition is naturally untenable.217 Third, critics argue
(perhaps most frequently) that the compensation statute will tend
to chill states from enacting environmental legislation.2" These
criticisms remain largely untested, however, as the considerable
exclusions provided by the statute have thwarted its most signifi-
cant challenges.21 9
Nevertheless, an unencumbered statutory trigger mechanism
could resolve the apparent unfairness illustrated in Palazzolo.
Under the federal scheme, the owner who retains a value greater
than "token interest" may not proceed with a Lucas claim.22 ° Con-
sequently, Palazzolo was denied compensation under Lucas, even
though his parcel suffered $2.95 million of deprivation.22' Clearly,
the nearly $3 million devaluation would trigger compensation
under a twenty-five percent trigger, thereby alleviating the need
to prove all three Penn Central factors in the alternative.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 228.
217. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
218. Cordes, supra note 196, at 228.
219. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 21 S.W.3d 375, 380 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding
that the plain language of the Texas Act excluded permit applications mandated by state
law); McMillan v. Northwest Harris County Mun. Util. Dist., 988 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tex.
App. 1999) (holding that the plain language of the Texas Act excluded standby fees levied
against property).
220. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464.
221. Id. at 2464-65.
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3. Mississippi's and Louisiana's Fractions
a. Q: What is the Proper Denominator?
A: Any Part or Portion of the Property.
Two other compensation statutes directly address the final
question of the proper denominator, albeit on a scope considera-
bly more limited than the Texas statute. Mississippi's Agricul-
tural and Forestry Activity Act (the 'Mississippi Act") compen-
sates owners of agricultural and forestry land for state
regulations that "prohibit[] or severely limit[]" agricultural and
forestry activities.222 The Mississippi Act recognizes this depriva-
tion as a statutory "inverse condemnation,"223 and establishes a
forty percent devaluation to trigger compensation.224 The statute
further defines "taking" to include actions under the United
States and Mississippi Constitutions, where the owner is "enti-
tled to compensation for the fair market value of the owner's
property or some part thereof."22 Thus, the Mississippi Act pro-
vides a fractional denominator for farm and forestry land tak-
ings.226
The Louisiana statute operates similarly. Louisiana provides
that owners of private agricultural properties may bring takings
claims where governmental action "caused a diminution in value"
in the property.2 27 "Diminution in value" is defined by statute as a
twenty percent reduction in market value of "the affected portion
of any parcel of private agricultural property."221
b. A Footnote Resolved
It is a monument to the Supreme Court's continuing inability to dis-
cern the denominator in the "takings fraction" that "footnote seven"
is entering the pantheon of telling footnotes in American law....
[Olne could hardly expect the Court to profess such an inability in
establishing a doctrine in which the answer will be so outcome de-
terminative.
229
222. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-3 (1999).
223. Id. § 49-33-7(e).
224. Id. § 49-33-7(h).
225. Id. § 49-33-7(1) (emphasis added).
226. Id.
227. LA. REv. STAT. -ANN. § 3:3610(A) (West Supp. 2002).
228. Id. § 3:3602(11) (emphasis added).
229. EAGLE, supra note 123, at 792.
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As the rhetoric of Palazzolo makes clear, the "difficult, persist-
ing question of what is the proper denominator in the takings
fraction"23 ° has remained unsettled since Lucas's famous foot-
note.23' The Supreme Court has nevertheless traditionally and
consistently analyzed the amount of deprivation in comparison to
the entire parcel.232 In the context of the Mississippi and Louisi-
ana statutes, however, the answer is statutorily prescribed:
courts may recognize a taking of any divisible portion of the prop-
erty that reaches the compensation trigger.
Clearly, the use of the fractional denominator substantially in-
creases the likelihood that regulations may be found to effectuate
a taking.233 Critics challenge that the use of the fractional de-
nominator, as well as compensation statutes generally, will result
in incalculable administrative and compensation costs.23 4 How-
ever, the utility of identifying the appropriate denominator in a
takings action, whether fractional or whole, is unquestionable.
c. Fraction Strategy
Yet it is here, regarding the takings fraction, that the dissent
in Palazzolo most explicitly rails against the promotion of strate-
gic behavior in takings determinations.235 Justice Breyer restates
the criticisms of several amici warning against validation of the
takings fraction, reasoning that
to allow complete regulatory takings claims to survive changes in
land ownership could allow property owners to manufacture such
claims by strategically transferring property until only a nonusable
portion remains. But I do not see how a constitutional provision con-
230. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465.
231. The Court stated that
[r]egrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasi-
ble use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear
the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured.
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situa-
tion as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically benefi-
cial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
232. Cordes, supra note 196, at 214.
233. Id. at 215.
234. Id. at 227-28.
235. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477-78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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cerned with "fairness and justice" could reward any such strategic
behavior.
2 3 6
Thus, by "conceptually severing" the property interest at issue in
the takings claim,237 Justice Breyer argues that a takings plaintiff
may skew the scope of the taking to his strategic advantage.
This criticism, sans the constitutional subtext, applies with
equal force to the Mississippi and Louisiana statutes. Each nar-
row the scope of the takings question to "the affected portion of
any parcel" 9 and "any part or parcel" of the affected area.24 °
Like the percentage-based compensation statute of Texas, these
fractional takings statutes dramatically increase the likelihood
that a taking may be found.24' Because these statutes only apply
to agricultural and forestry lands, however, the strategic advan-
tage is minimized considerably.2
42
Like previous strategy analysis, the viability of fraction strat-
egy depends upon one's conception of the property right at issue.
Under the traditional "bundle of rights" understanding of prop-
erty, which the Court referenced in Palazzolo,243 the notion that
interests of the bundle may be severed and "taken" by regulation
is (at least conceptually) palpable.2' At least one commentator
suggests that the interests bundled by common law include five
"axes": (1) temporal; (2) vertical extensiveness; (3) horizontal ex-
tensiveness; (4) freedom from intensive regulation; and (5) the
commercial unit.245 If these interests are divisible from the fee
simple, then fractional takings statutes may be permitted to ex-
tend beyond the limited scope endorsed by Mississippi and Lou-
isiana. Counterposed against the public interest, however, the
owner's strategic interests may be correspondingly outweighed.
The success of the fractional taking strategy may thus hinge on
236. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24
(1978)) (emphasis added).
237. For a discussion of severable interests, see EAGLE, supra note 123, at 805-14.
238. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
239. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3602(11) (West Supp. 2002).
240. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(h) (2001).
241. Cordes, supra note 196, at 215.
242. Id.
243. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2462.
244. EAGLE, supra note 123, at 83.
245. Id. at 805-14.
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whether the common law of each state recognizes such a populist
stick in its Lockean bundle.
VI. CONCLUSION
The search for an adequate takings formula has been described
as "the lawyer's equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the
quark."246 Perhaps it began with Justice Holmes' cryptic guidance
in Pennsylvania Coal.247 Or perhaps it derives simply from the
contentiousness of the parties to the question. Nevertheless, it is
clear that the field of takings jurisprudence remains decidedly
unclear, even in the aftermath of Palazzolo.
While Palazzolo does bring lawyers closer to discovering "the
quark," an adequate takings formula remains absent. As evi-
denced by this comment, state private property rights statutes
may make clear the contours of regulatory takings law by resolv-
ing the ripeness, expectations, compensation, and denominator
issues left undecided by Palazzolo. Undoubtedly, the answers
posed by state legislatures in the form of private property stat-
utes remain highly controversial: each provide landowners with
strategic advantage in staking their claim of compensation. Yet
these answers may provide federal lawmakers with the template
necessary to fasten a legislative solution to the takings dilemma.
As states continue to legislate answers to their own takings ques-
tions, and as federal case law converges thereupon, the patch-
work of federal case law and state statutory law continues to give
form to the long sought formula. A solution to the takings di-
lemma, to the delight of the takings claimant, may therefore be at
hand.
Michael A. Culpepper
246. HAAR & WOLF, supra note 107, at 875.
247. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
